Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery?
Publication date
जुल, 2015Details
NIPFP Working Paper No. 152Authors
Panchali Banerjee and Vivekananda MukherjeeAbstract
The paper theoretically explores the impact of introducing bureaucratic competition on corruption. For this purpose it considers three different measures of corruption such as corruption incidence (CI), relative corruption incidence (CRI) and corruption rents (CR) in two different types of economies namely corruption-tolerant economies and corruption-reliant economies. As it compares both intensive margin (i.e. the magnitude of bribe) and extensive margin (i.e. the number of bribe incident) of corruption with and without bureaucratic competition, it turns out that as traditionally perceived the introduction of bureaucratic corruption does not necessarily reduce corruption in an economy. The outcome depends on the type of the economy that has been studied, the measure of corruption being used and the initial level of corruption in the economy. Among the counterintuitive results, we find that in a corruption-tolerant economy going by the CI measure, corruption is always higher under competitive regime compared to monopoly regime. The same holds true if the CR measure is used in such economies with sufficiently high share of corrupt officials. In a reliant economy, if CRI measure is applied, corruption is more in competitive regime.